The European Commission has confirmed a data breach after its Europa.eu web platform was hacked in a cyberattack claimed by the ShinyHunters extortion gang. [...]
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A lot of the information seen on DShield honeypots [1] is repeated bot traffic, especially when looking at the Cowrie [2] telnet and SSH sessions. However, how long a session lasts, how many commands are run per session and what the last commands run before a session disconnects can vary. Some of this information could help indicate whether a session is automated and if a honeypot was fingerprinted. This information can also be used to find more interesting honeypot sessions. To get an idea of what that variety looks like, I reviewed about 3 years of data from 6 honeypots. Some of the honeypots have been running for different periods of time, but it should give a good overview of different attacks seen on telnet/SSH honeypots. Since I already made a python script [3] that summarizes some of this data for me, it made the process a bit easier. Before going into the details, some of the basic information: Data Timeframe: 4/13/2022 - 3/21/2026 Number of Sessions: 1,206,566 Min Max Median Mean Range (Max-Min) Number of Commands Per Session 0 27742 17.49 20.0 27742 Duration of Sessions (Seconds) 0.041 1563.38 17.42 22.80 1563.38 Figure 1: Basic statistics for Cowrie session durations and number of commands run per session. In most sessions, we see about 20 commands and a session lasts for about 20 seconds. Number of Commands Per Session When a Cowrie session is allowed through, the client connection has the option of running commands. They client may decide to disconnect, run an automated script or run commands manually. Most of the time, there are usually under 30 commands run per session, but there are some sessions that have had over 25,000 commands run in a single session. Figure 2: There are many telnet/SSH sessions interacting with DShield honeypots that run over 25,000 commands in a single session, but most are much lower. Figure 3: Looking at most frequenty occuring number of commands run per telnet/SSH session, the majority are under 50 commads with the most frequent being 22 commands in a session. Commands in session Sessions found Percentage Running total 22 461,561 38.26% 38.26% 20 348,708 28.91% 67.17% 1 104,217 8.64% 75.81% 3 58,850 4.88% 80.69% 9 39,111 3.24% 83.93% 13 28,274 2.34% 86.27% 46 27,595 2.29% 88.56% 5 25,302 2.10% 90.66% 18 20,174 1.67% 92.33% 10 19,188 1.59% 93.92% Figure 4: The top 10 most commonly seen number of commands run in a session accounts for about 94% of the telnet/SSH sessions. Are the sessions with 22 commands similar? To help commands for differnet sessions the commands per session were concatenated and then hashed to arrive at a value that could be compared across sessions. This value would be the same if the same commands were run in the same order. This seemed like a great idea until I found a very small number of similar hashes when looking at sessions with 22 commands. Rather than seeing tens or hundreds of thousands of similar hashes, there were only 4. Looking more closely at the data demonstrated what w
The Handala hackers associated with Iran have breached the personal email account of FBI Director Kash Patel and published photos and documents. [...]
A vulnerability in the Smart Slider 3 WordPress plugin, active on more than 800,000 websites, can be exploited to allow subscriber-level users access to arbitrary files on the server. [...]
ShinyHunters claims it breached European Commission systems, leaking 350GB of data. Officials are investigating, with no independent verification yet.
Threat actors with ties to Iran successfully broke into the personal email account of Kash Patel, the director of the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and leaked a cache of photos and other documents to the internet. Handala Hack Team, which carried out the breach, said on its website that Patel "will now find his name among the list of successfully hacked victims." In a statement
This is the third update to the TeamPCP supply chain campaign threat intelligence report, When the Security Scanner Became the Weapon (v3.0, March 25, 2026). Update 002 covered developments through March 27, including the Telnyx PyPI compromise and Vect ransomware partnership. This update covers developments from March 27-28, 2026. HIGH: First 48-Hour Window Without a New Supply Chain Compromise The most operationally significant development in the last 24 hours is what did not happen: no new package compromises have been confirmed since the Telnyx disclosure on March 27. This is the first 48-hour window without a new ecosystem compromise since TeamPCP began active operations on March 19. The prior operational cadence was aggressive -- a new target every 1-3 days (Trivy March 19, CanisterWorm March 20-22, Checkmarx March 23, LiteLLM March 24, Telnyx March 27). The current pause, combined with the Vect ransomware affiliate announcement, suggests TeamPCP has shifted primary operational focus from supply chain expansion to monetization of existing credential harvests. Analysts assess this pause should not be interpreted as the end of supply chain operations. TeamPCP explicitly stated they intend to be around for a long time, and stolen credentials from the estimated 300 GB trove could enable future package compromises at any time. The absence of new compromises may also reflect improved vigilance by package registries -- PyPI has quarantined two TeamPCP campaigns in rapid succession, which may be raising the attacker's cost of operations on that platform. Recommended action: Maintain heightened monitoring posture. Use this operational window to complete credential rotations and IOC sweeps if not already done. The CISA KEV remediation deadline for CVE-2026-33634 is now 11 days away (April 8, 2026). HIGH: Palo Alto Networks Publishes Behavioral Detection Rules for CI/CD Pipeline Attacks Palo Alto Networks has published detection rules specifically designed to identify TeamPCP-style CI/CD pipeline attacks at the behavioral level rather than relying solely on IOC matching. This is significant because TeamPCP has demonstrated the ability to rotate infrastructure across each new compromise wave -- each phase used different C2 domains, different exfiltration endpoints, and different packaging techniques (raw scripts, npm worm, .pth exploitation, WAV steganography). Behavioral detection approaches focus on anomalous CI/CD runner behavior: unexpected credential directory enumeration, bulk secret reads from /proc/ pid /mem , large encrypted archive creation, and outbound data transfers to newly registered domains during workflow execution. These patterns have been consistent across all five TeamPCP compromise phases even as specific IOCs changed. Recommended action: Organizations with Palo Alto Networks security products should review and deploy the published detection rules. All organizations should evaluate whether their CI/CD monitoring can detect the
A new info-stealing malware named Infinity Stealer is targeting macOS systems with a Python payload packaged as an executable using the open-source Nuitka compiler. [...]
Lloyds Banking Group to compensate 450,000 customers after app glitch exposed data. Find out how the glitch affected…
A recently disclosed critical security flaw impacting Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway is witnessing active reconnaissance activity, according to Defused Cyber and watchTowr. The vulnerability, CVE-2026-3055 (CVSS score: 9.3), refers to a case of insufficient input validation leading to memory overread, which an attacker could exploit to leak potentially sensitive information. Per
Proofpoint has disclosed details of a targeted email campaign in which threat actors with ties to Russia are leveraging the recently disclosed DarkSword exploit kit to target iOS devices. The activity has been attributed with high confidence to the Russian state-sponsored threat group known as TA446, which is also tracked by the broader cybersecurity community under the monikers Callisto,
The U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) on Friday added a critical security flaw impacting F5 BIG-IP Access Policy Manager (APM) to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, citing evidence of active exploitation. The vulnerability in question is CVE-2025-53521 (CVSS v4 score: 9.3), which could allow a threat actor to achieve remote code execution. "When a
Iran-linked Handala hackers breached FBI Chief Kash Patel’s Gmail, leaking photos and documents. Officials say no classified data was exposed.
ShinyHunters leaves BreachForums, leaks data of 300,000 users, warns all active domains are fake, and threatens more leaks from forum backups.
TeamPCP hackers compromised the Telnyx package on the Python Package Index today, uploading malicious versions that deliver credential-stealing malware hidden inside a WAV file. [...]
Better NTLM Relaying Functionality This week’s release brings an improvement to the SMB NTLM relay server. In the past, it’s support has been expanded with modules for relaying to HTTP (ESC8), MSSQL and LDAP while still receiving connections over the humble SMB service. Prior to this release, clients required a key behavior in how they handled SMB’s STATUS_NETWORK_SESSION_EXPIRED error code, in order to relay a single authentication attempt to multiple targets. Most clients other than Window’s “net use” do not handle these errors and were thus incompatible with Metasploit SMB NTLM relaying capabilities. Now, when a single target is specified, Metasploit alters its relaying strategy to forward the Net-NTLM messages immediately, making it compatible with a broader range of clients including Linux’s smbclient. In addition, the client in RubySMB was updated to mimic the behaviour of “net use” allowing authentication attempts from RubySMB to be relayed to multiple targets successfully. New module content (3) ESC/POS Printer Command Injector Author: FutileSkills Type: Auxiliary Pull request: #20478 contributed by futileskills Path: admin/printer/escpos_tcp_command_injector Description: Adds a new auxiliary module that exploits CVE-2026-23767, an unauthenticated ESC/POS command vulnerability in networked Epson-compatible printers. The vulnerability allows an attacker to send crafted commands over the network to inject custom ESC/POS print commands, which are used in various receipt printers. Eclipse Che machine-exec Unauthenticated RCE Authors: Greg Durys [email protected] and Richard Leach Type: Exploit Pull request: #20835 contributed by GregDurys Path: linux/http/eclipse_che_machine_exec_rce AttackerKB reference: CVE-2025-12548 Description: This adds a module for CVE-2025-12548, an unauthenticated RCE in the Eclipse Che machine-exec service. The vulnerability allows attackers to connect over WebSocket on port 3333 and execute commands via JSON-RPC without authentication. This affects Red Hat OpenShift DevSpaces environments. Barracuda ESG TAR Filename Command Injection Authors: Curt Hyvarinen, Mandiant, and cfielding-r7 Type: Exploit Pull request: #21033 contributed by Alpenlol Path: linux/smtp/barracuda_esg_tarfile_rce AttackerKB reference: CVE-2023-2868 Description: Adds exploit module for CVE-2023-2868, a command injection vulnerability in Barracuda Email Security Gateway (ESG) appliances. Filenames in TAR attachments are passed to shell commands without sanitization, allowing RCE via backtick injection. Enhancements and features (1) #21049 from h00die - This updates post modules to use an API that will expand multiple environment variables when set within the WritableDir option. Bugs fixed (5) #20967 from jheysel-r7 - This fix an issue that prevents successful authentication relay from Ruby SMB Client and smbclient. These clients are now compatible with Msf::Exploit::Remote::SMB::RelayServer. #21148 from adfoster-r7 - Fixes a bug where
The Hawaiian bobtail squid has bioluminescent bacteria .
High-value assets including domain controllers, web servers, and identity infrastructure are frequent targets in sophisticated attacks. Microsoft Defender applies asset-aware protection using Microsoft Security Exposure Management to detect and block threats against these critical systems. This article explores real-world attack scenarios and defense techniques. As cyberthreats continue to grow in scale, speed, and sophistication, organizations must pay close attention to the systems that form their backbone: High-Value Assets (HVAs). These assets include the servers, services, identities, and infrastructure essential for business operations and security. Examples include domain controllers that manage authentication and authorization across the network; web servers hosting business-critical applications such as Exchange or SharePoint; identity systems that enable secure access across on-premises and cloud environments; and other components such as certificate authorities and internet-facing services that provide access to corporate applications. This reinforces a simple but important idea: not all assets carry the same risk, and protections should reflect their role and impact. To support this, we continue to expand differentiated protections for the assets that matter most. These efforts focus on helping organizations reduce risk, disrupt high-impact attack paths, and strengthen overall resilience. Microsoft Defender already provides enhanced protection for critical assets through capabilities such as automatic attack disruption . In this article, we explore how additional security layers further strengthen risk-based protection. Using asset context to strengthen detection In recent years, human-operated cyberattacks have evolved from sporadic, opportunistic intrusions into targeted campaigns designed to maximize impact. Analysis shows that in more than 78% of these attacks, threat actors successfully compromise a High-Value Asset, such as a domain controller, to gain deeper, elevated access within the organization. Traditional endpoint detection methods rely on behavioral signals such as process execution, command-line activity, and file operations. While effective in many scenarios, these signals often lack context about the asset being targeted. Administrative tools, scripting frameworks, and system utilities can appear identical in both legitimate and malicious use. This is where understanding a device’s role becomes essential. On high-value assets such as domain controllers or identity infrastructure, even small risks matter because the potential impact is significantly higher. Activities that may be routine on general-purpose servers or administrative workstations can indicate compromise when observed on Tier-0 systems. Defender incorporates a critical asset framework to enrich detection with this context. This intelligence is powered by Microsoft Security Exposure Management, where critical assets, attack paths, and cross-workload relati
Google fast-tracks post-quantum cryptography with a 2029 deadline as researchers warn quantum computers could break current encryption sooner than expected.