Security teams have never had better visibility into their environments and never been worse at confirming what they fix stays fixed. Mandiant's M-Trends 2026 report puts the mean time to exploit at an estimated negative seven days. The Verizon 2025 DBIR puts median time to remediate edge device vulnerabilities at 32 days. These numbers have understandably driven the industry toward a clear
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The UK’s AI Security Institute evaluated GPT-5.5’s ability to find security vulnerabilities, and found that it is comparable to Claude Mythos. Note that the OpenAI model is generally available. Here is the Institute’s evaluation of Mythos. And here is an analysis of a smaller, cheaper model. It requires more scaffolding from the prompter, but it is also just as good.
The G7 Cybersecurity Working Group releases new SBOM for AI guidance, outlining seven key data clusters to boost transparency and security across AI supply chains
Microsoft on Tuesday released patches for 138 security vulnerabilities spanning its product portfolio, although none of them have been listed as publicly known or under active attack. Of the 138 flaws, 30 are rated Critical, 104 are rated Important, three are rated Moderate, and one is rated Low in severity. As many as 61 vulnerabilities are classified as privilege escalation bugs, followed by
Canadian telecom providers face mounting cyber threats from ransomware, SIM swapping, data breaches, and nation-state attacks targeting critical infrastructure.
UK cybersecurity sector reaches £14.7bn in revenue, driven by rapid growth in AI security firms, increased investment and rising employment across the industry
Microsoft has patched 120 vulnerabilities in this month’s security update round
Cybersecurity researchers are calling attention to a new campaign dubbed GemStuffer that has targeted the RubyGems repository with more than 150 gems that use the registry as a data exfiltration channel rather than for malware distribution. "The packages do not appear designed for mass developer compromise," Socket said. "Many have little or no download activity, and the payloads are repetitive,
We recently published an exploit chain for the Google Pixel 9 that demonstrated it was possible to go from a zero-click context to root on Android in just two exploits. The Dolby 0-click vulnerability existed across all of Android, until it was patched in January 2026. While we had an exploit chain for the Pixel 9, we wanted to see if it was possible to write a similar exploit chain for Pixel 10. Updating the Dolby Exploit Altering our exploit for CVE-2025-54957 was fairly straightforward. The majority of needed changes involved updating offsets calculated for the specific version of the library we targeted on the Pixel 9 to similar offsets in the library for Pixel 10. The only challenge (outside of wishing we’d better documented which syncframes contained offsets) was that the Pixel 10 uses RET PAC in the place of -fstack-protector , which meant that __stack_chk_fail wasn’t available to be overwritten by code. After a bit of trial and error, we used dap_cpdp_init , initialization code that can be overwritten without causing functional problems, as it is called once when the decoder is initialized and never again. The updated Dolby UDC exploit is available here . This exploit will only work on unpatched devices (SPL December 2025 or earlier). Removal of BigWave, Addition of VPU Porting the local privilege escalation link of the chain to Pixel 10 was not feasible as the BigWave driver does not ship on this device. However, a new driver is visible in the mediacodec SELinux context at /dev/vpu. This driver is used for interacting with the Chips Media Wave677DV silicon on the Tensor G5 chip meant for accelerating video decoding. Based on the comments within the open-source C files, this driver is developed and maintained by the same set of developers who built the BigWave driver. Working in collaboration with Jann Horn, we spent 2 hours auditing this VPU driver and discovered an exceptional vulnerability. Unlike the upstream Linux driver for WAVE521C (which is an older Chips Media chip), the Pixel driver for WAVE677DV does not integrate with V4L2 (the “Video for Linux API”); instead, it directly exposes the chip’s hardware interface to userspace, including letting userspace map the chip’s MMIO register interface. The driver mainly establishes device memory mappings, does power management, and allows userspace to wait for interrupts from the chip. The Holy Grail of Kernel Vulnerabilities This bug in particular caught our attention as exceptionally simple to exploit: static int vpu_mmap ( struct file * fp , struct vm_area_struct * vm ) { unsigned long pfn ; struct vpu_core * core = container_of ( fp - f_inode - i_cdev , struct vpu_core , cdev ); vm_flags_set ( vm , VM_IO | VM_DONTEXPAND | VM_DONTDUMP ); /* This is a CSRs mapping, use pgprot_device */ vm - vm_page_prot = pgprot_device ( vm - vm_page_prot ); pfn = core - paddr PAGE_SHIFT ; return remap_pfn_range ( vm , vm - vm_start , pfn , vm - vm_end - vm - vm_start , vm - vm_page_prot ) ? - EAGAIN : 0
CVSSv3 Score: 7.8 CVE-2026-31431In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: algif_aead - Revert to operating out-of-place This mostly reverts commit 72548b093ee3 except for the copying of the associated data. There is no benefit in operating in-place in algif_aead since the source and destination come from different mappings. Get rid of all the complexity added for in-place operation and just copy the AD directly. Revised on 2026-05-13 00:00:00
Google on Tuesday unveiled a new opt-in Android feature called Intrusion Logging for storing forensic logs to better analyze sophisticated spyware attacks. Intrusion Logging, available as part of Advanced Protection Mode, enables "persistent and privacy-preserving forensics logging to allow for investigation of devices in the event of a suspected compromise," the company said. The feature, it
[This is a Guest Diary by Joshua Nikolson, an ISC Intern and part of the SANS.edu Bachelor's degree in Applied Cybersecurity (BACS) program.] Introduction One day at work, a friend messaged me, How do you check a website to see if it s legit? This friend recently received a phishing text message from a bank , and I figured he wanted to be careful and double-check. I told him to put the URL into VirusTotal but said that just because it may say it s clean, that doesn t mean it s not malicious. He sent me a screenshot of the VirusTotal page for the URL, with no detections and everything showing green. I took a moment to look at it a little more closely. The domain name was unusual, and right off the bat I could see it had been created in the last few months. As of now, it has one detection from a vendor. All domains mentioned in this blogpost will be listed in the Indicators of Compromise section at the end. Going to the site, I could immediately tell that something was off about it. It was a secondhand marketplace that seemed to sell just about everything under the sun, with tons of listings in each category and items priced too good to be true. While the site had that AI vibecoded feeling , I wanted to give my friend something more concrete other than don t trust this site . I decided to reverse image search one of the product images, a Lenovo ThinkPad battery replacement, and after some digging, I found an eBay listing with all the same product images and item descriptions. I did this for a few more of the site s listings and came to the same result. I let my friend know, and he said, Yeah, it looked too good to be true . Finding a Marketplace I found this interesting and wanted to see if I could find something similar again. Today, it is trivial to use AI to mass-deploy these scams, and I wanted to see what would happen if I tried to buy something. Let s look up what my friend was originally looking for: a Texas Instruments TI-nSpire CAS calculator. Simply searching on Google and going to the second page, something pops out to me. Why is a driving school selling a calculator? The search result link, hxxps://desidrivingschool[.]com/listing/164903741/ redirects to a marketplace where it is for sale: This domain looks suspicious on its own, and to add insult to injury, it was registered ~12 days ago on April 3rd, 2026: What's happening here? You may be asking why this Desi Driving School is showing up in the search results for this calculator? Good question. If you append /sitemap.xml to the URL, you can see tons of these listings that are meant to infiltrate the search results. This is a prime example of SEO poisoning, in which potential victims are lured through their shopping searches to these fake marketplaces. Threat actors have previously used compromised WordPress sites as command-and-control infrastructure or to stage payloads, but this is being used as a distinct attack vector. Unfortunately, this website was likely compromised, wh
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.. if unproxyable is a word that is .. I had a recent engagement where I had to look at the network traffic generated by a Windows executable. Unfortunately, it was all TLS, and all TLS1.3 to boot. So from a PCAP all I got was a whole lot of yup, that s encrypted , and since it was TLSv1.3 all I really had to work with was the IP addresses, not even server names in the server hello packets to help out. And the IP addresses involved were those 500 DNS names AWS shotgun addresses, so no help there. What I really needed was something to take specific traffic, say traffic from an executable, and redirect that to a proxy. If that proxy is then burp suite, then Bob s yer Uncle, now I can look at the traffic!! If you d rather use fiddler or some other proxy, go for it, anything will work. A few minutes of Googling, and I found Proxifier ( https://www.proxifier.com/ ) Proxifier allows you set up rules, for instance send traffic from abc.exe to proxy A , send traffic from def.exe to proxy B , or send everything else direct , or any combination. Proxies can be direct or Socks5. In my case, I was looking at a client executable, and was able to follow all the API calls and data transferred, it was EXACTLY what I needed that day. I can t show you the client output - watching the API s roll by was as cool as it gets though, and the proxy intercept in burp lets you play with individual calls if that s what you need. But I can certainly show you how this works, let s use curl as our example exe. Let's start in proxifier. First you need to set up your proxy(s). In this case I'm using Burp Suite Pro running locally, so the proxy is: Next, we ll set up the rules: The first rule says anything to my own machine, send direct . Given how much loopback cruft happens on a typical Windows box, this rule is gold (unless that s what you are looking for that is). The second rule is anything from curl.exe, send to the proxy we just defined (or whatever your executable is). You can have multiple of these rules doing different things. The final rule is everything else, send direct Now, let s run a test with curl: (and so on) On proxifier, you see the transaction happen in real time: The top pane shows the executable, target and so on. It s somewhat ephemeral, it ll show the live view, then will go grey after the transaction complets, then after a few second disappears. The bottom pane scrolls in a more log like manner. Over in Burp, you see all the business that most sites have as their lead page: Which is exactly what you need, and can't get these days from a packet capture! What else does Proxifier do? It also spits out a configurable log file, you can configure what s in the logs and where to send it: You can set similar sensitivity on the live on-screen log. All in all, this tool was a life-saver for me, I ve used it for a few years now and keep coming up with things that it can bail me out of! Got a cool use for a tool like this? Give it a try and share your ex
Microsoft is publishing 137 vulnerabilities on May 2026 Patch Tuesday . Microsoft is not aware of exploitation in the wild or public disclosure for any of these vulnerabilities. So far this month, Microsoft has provided patches to address 133 browser vulnerabilities, which are not included in the Patch Tuesday count above. Windows Netlogon: critical RCE Anyone responsible for securing a domain controller should prioritize remediation of CVE-2026-41089 , which is a critical stack-based buffer overflow in Windows Netlogon with a CVSS v3 base score of 9.8. Exploitation leads to execution in the context of the Netlogon service, so that’s SYSTEM privileges on the domain controller. For most pentesters, that’s the point at which the customer report more or less writes itself. No privileges or user interaction are required, and attack complexity is low, which suggests that creation of a reliable exploit might not be especially difficult for anyone with knowledge of the specific mechanism. Microsoft assesses exploitation as less likely, but since those exploitability assessments are provided without an accompanying explanation, it’s not clear how much reassurance defenders should take. Anyone who remembers the much-discussed CVE-2020-1472 (aka ZeroLogon) back in 2020 will note that CVE-2026-41089 offers an attacker more immediate control of a domain controller. Patches are available for all versions of Windows Server from 2012 onwards. Windows DNS Client: critical RCE An attacker looking for a master key for Windows assets will pay attention to CVE-2026-41096 , a critical RCE in the Windows DNS client implementation. A modern computer talks to DNS the way a child in the back of a car asks “are we there yet?” The variable and complex structure of DNS responses means that DNS client implementations are also complex and thus prone to flaws. Microsoft assesses exploitation as less likely, and we can hope that modern mitigations such as heap address randomization and optional-but-recommended encrypted channel DNS will make weaponization significantly more challenging by putting barriers across specific paths to exploitation. The DNS client on Windows runs as the NetworkService role, rather than SYSTEM, but a foothold is a foothold, and skilled attackers expect to chain exploits together. JIRA/Confluence Entra ID auth plugin: critical EoP If you’re still self-hosting Atlassian JIRA or Confluence and relying on the Microsoft Entra ID authentication plugin, you’ll want to know about CVE-2026-41103 . This critical elevation of privilege vulnerability allows an unauthorized attacker to impersonate an existing user by presenting forged credentials, thus bypassing Entra ID. Microsoft expects that exploitation is more likely. Even if you can’t always find what you want on the corporate Confluence, a motivated attacker probably will. Curiously, the patch links on the advisory lead to older versions of the plugins published in 2024. Microsoft WARP team Microsoft’s WARP
The U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security is calling on Instructure executives to testify about two cyberattacks by the ShinyHunters extortion group that targeted the company's Canvas platform, allowing threat actors to steal student data and disrupt schools during final exams. [...]
In this article Core Idea: From TTPs to Logs Approaches for Synthetic Attack Log Generation Evaluation Datasets References Learn more Logs and telemetry are the foundation of modern cybersecurity. They enable threat detection, incident response, forensic investigation, and compliance across endpoints, networks, and cloud environments. Yet, despite their importance, high‑quality security attack logs are notoriously difficult to collect, especially at scale. Real‑world security telemetry is often composed of repeated benign activity occurring across environments and with very rare malicious activity. Gathering, labeling, and maintaining datasets with real attack logs is costly and operationally challenging. It requires not only labeling malicious activities, but also fully reconstructing attack scenarios. These challenges significantly slow detection engineering and limit the quality of both the rule-based detection authoring and anomaly-detection approaches. In this post, we explore a different path: using AI to generate realistic, high‑fidelity synthetic security attack logs. By translating attacker behaviors, expressed as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)—directly into structured telemetry, we aim to accelerate detection development while preserving realism and security. Why is this work important for Microsoft Defender customers? For Microsoft Defender customers, this work is crucial because it directly addresses the challenge of obtaining high-quality, realistic security attack logs needed for effective threat detection and response. By leveraging AI-driven synthetic log generation, organizations can accelerate the development of detection rules and AI-based automation approaches, while ensuring privacy and reducing operational overhead. Synthetic logs enable customers to simulate a broader range of attack scenarios—including rare and emerging threats—without exposing sensitive data or relying on costly lab-based simulations. Ultimately, this approach enhances the agility and effectiveness of Microsoft Defender detection and response capabilities, helping customers stay ahead of evolving cyber threats. Why Synthetic Security Logs in addition to Lab Simulations? Synthetic data has been widely adopted in various fields as a privacy-conscious substitute for real data, and it offers even greater advantages in cybersecurity. It enables the creation of safe, shareable datasets that avoid exposure of sensitive customer information, allows simulation of rare or emerging attacks that are challenging to observe in real environments, accelerates the process of detection engineering and testing, and supports reproducible experiments for benchmarking and evaluation. While synthetic logs are not a replacement for all lab-based validation, they can complement lab simulations by speeding up early-stage detection design, testing, and coverage expansion. Traditionally, generating realistic attack telemetry requires executing real attacks in controlled
In this article AI-powered vulnerability discovery at hyper-scale Codename: MDASH—Microsoft Security’s new multi-model agentic scanning harness Using codename MDASH for security research The 5.12.2026 Patch Tuesday cohort Two deep dives CVE-2026-33827—Remote unauthenticated UAF in tcpip.sys via SSRR CVE-2026-33824: Unauthenticated IKEv2 SA_INIT + fragmentation → double-free → LocalSystem RCE How capable is codename MDASH? What this all means Conclusion Today Microsoft announced a major step forward in AI-powered cyber defense: our new agentic security system helped researchers find 16 new vulnerabilities across the Windows networking and authentication stack—including four Critical remote code execution flaws in components such as the Windows kernel TCP/IP stack and the IKEv2 service. They used the new Microsoft Security m ulti-mo d el a gentic s canning h arness (codename MDASH) which was built by Microsoft’s Autonomous Code Security team. Unlike single-model approaches, the harness orchestrates more than 100 specialized AI agents across an ensemble of frontier and distilled models to discover, debate, and prove exploitable bugs end-to-end. Learn more and sign up to join the preview The results speak for themselves: 21 of 21 planted vulnerabilities found with zero false positives on a private test driver; 96% recall against five years of confirmed Microsoft Security Response Center (MSRC) cases in clfs.sys and 100% in tcpip.sys; and an industry-leading 88.45% score on the public CyberGym benchmark of 1,507 real-world vulnerabilities—the top score on the leaderboard, roughly five points ahead of the next entry. The strategic implication is clear: AI vulnerability discovery has crossed from research curiosity into production-grade defense at enterprise scale, and the durable advantage lies in the agentic system around the model rather than any single model itself. Codename MDASH is being used by Microsoft security engineering teams and tested by a small set of customers as part of a limited private preview. This post explains how codename MDASH works, what we shipped today, what we learned along the way, and how you can sign up for the private preview. AI-powered vulnerability discovery at hyper-scale The Microsoft Autonomous Code Security (ACS) team was assembled to take AI-powered vulnerability research from a research curiosity to production engineering at enterprise scale. Several members of this team came to Microsoft from Team Atlanta, the team that won the $20 million DARPA AI Cyber Challenge by building an autonomous cyber-reasoning system that found and patched real bugs in complex open-source projects. The lessons from that work, especially the level of engineering required to make the frontier language models perform professional-level security auditing, are what our new multi-model agentic scanning harness (codename MDASH) is built around. Microsoft’s code base is challenging for security auditing for a few reasons: Massive propr
Artificial intelligence platforms may be just as susceptible to social engineering as human beings, but they are proving remarkably good at finding security vulnerabilities in human-made computer code. That reality is on full display this month with some of the more widely-used software makers — including Apple , Google , Microsoft , Mozilla and Oracle — fixing near record volumes of security bugs, and/or quickening the tempo of their patch releases. As it does on the second Tuesday of every month, Microsoft today released software updates to address at least 118 security vulnerabilities in its various Windows operating systems and other products. Remarkably, this is the first Patch Tuesday in nearly two years that Microsoft is not shipping any fixes to deal with emergency zero-day flaws that are already being exploited. Nor have any of the flaws fixed today been previously disclosed (potentially giving attackers a heads up in how to exploit the weakness). Sixteen of the vulnerabilities earned Microsoft’s most-dire “critical” label, meaning malware or miscreants could abuse these bugs to seize remote control over a vulnerable Windows device with little or no help from the user. Rapid7 has done much of the heavy lifting in identifying some of the more concerning critical weaknesses this month, including: CVE-2026-41089 : A critical stack-based buffer overflow in Windows Netlogon that offers an attacker SYSTEM privileges on the domain controller. No privileges or user interaction are required, and attack complexity is low. Patches are available for all versions of Windows Server from 2012 onwards. CVE-2026-41096 : A critical RCE in the Windows DNS client implementation worthy of attention despite Microsoft assessing exploitation as less likely. CVE-2026-41103 : A critical elevation of privilege vulnerability that allows an unauthorized attacker to impersonate an existing user by presenting forged credentials, thus bypassing Entra ID. Microsoft expects that exploitation is more likely. May’s Patch Tuesday is a welcome respite from April, which saw Microsoft fix a near-record 167 security flaws . Microsoft was among a few dozen tech giants given access to a “ Project Glasswing ,” a much-hyped AI capability developed by Anthropic that appears quite effective at unearthing security vulnerabilities in code. Apple, another early participant in Project Glasswing, typically fixes an average of 20 vulnerabilities each time it ships a security update for iOS devices, said Chris Goettl , vice president of product management at Ivanti . On May 11, Apple shipped updates to address at least 52 vulnerabilities and backported the changes all the way to iPhone 6s and iOS 15. Last month, Mozilla released Firefox 150 , which resolved a whopping 271 vulnerabilities that were reportedly discovered during the Glasswing evaluation. “Since Firefox 150.0.0 released, they have been on a more aggressive weekly cadence for
ShinyHunters says its shinyhunte.rs domain was suspended after the Canvas LMS attacks, forcing the group to move fully to its dark web (.onion) site.