Security & IT News

A ransomware group has claimed responsibility for hacking the electronics manufacturing giant Foxconn and is attempting to extort the company.

Research reveals that TeamPCP hijacked OIDC tokens to poison hundreds of TanStack, Mistral AI, and UiPath packages with the self-propagating Mini Shai-Hulud worm.

Instructure says it reached an agreement with ShinyHunters over the Canvas breach data

Foxconn, the world's largest electronics manufacturer, says some of its North American factories are now working to resume normal operations after a cyberattack. [...]

Survey of cybersecurity leaders suggests that majority would strongly consider paying cybercriminals, if that’s what it took to help restore encrypted systems

Google on Tuesday unveiled a new opt-in Android feature called Intrusion Logging for storing forensic logs to better analyze sophisticated spyware attacks. Intrusion Logging, available as part of Advanced Protection Mode, enables "persistent and privacy-preserving forensics logging to allow for investigation of devices in the event of a suspected compromise," the company said. The feature, it

Intrusion Logging is a new part of Android’s Advanced Protection Mode, which aims to help protect human rights activists, journalists, and dissidents from government spyware attack and law enforcement forensic devices.

Operation HumanitarianBait uses fake aid documents, GitHub-hosted payloads, and Python spyware to target Russian-speaking victims.

TeamPCP, the threat actor behind the recentsupply chain attack spree, has been linked to the compromise of the npm and PyPI packages from TanStack, UiPath, Mistral AI, OpenSearch, and Guardrails AI as part of a fresh Mini Shai-Hulud campaign. The affected npm packages have been modified to include an obfuscated JavaScript file ("router_init.js") that's designed to profile the execution

Checkmarx warned over the weekend that a rogue version of its Jenkins Application Security Testing (AST) plugin had been published on the Jenkins Marketplace. [...]

ThreatFabric finds new TrickMo Android banking trojan variant routing C2 through The Open Network

U.S. prosecutors said a ransomware gang fueled Russian government corruption, and allowed the gang's leaders to avoid paying taxes and dodge the country's military draft.

In this article Activity overview Mitigation and protection guidance Hunting queries Indicators of compromise Microsoft researchers continue to observe the evolution of an infostealer campaign distributing ClickFix ‑style instructions and targeting macOS users. In this recent iteration, threat actors attempt to take advantage of users who are looking for helpful advice on macOS-related issues (for example, optimizing their disk space) in blog sites and other user-driven content platforms by hosting their malicious commands in these sites. These commands, which are purported to install system utilities, load an infostealing malware like Macsync, Shub Stealer, and AMOS into the targets’ devices instead. The malware then collects and exfiltrates data, including media files, iCloud data and Keychain entries, and cryptocurrency wallet keys. In some campaigns, the malware replaces legitimate cryptocurrency wallet apps with trojanized versions, putting users at an added security risk. Prior iterations of this campaign delivered the infostealers through disk image ( .dmg ) files that required users to manually install an application. This recent activity reflects a shift in tradecraft, where threat actors instruct users to run Terminal commands that leverage native utilities to retrieve remotely hosted content, followed by script‑based loader execution. Unlike application bundles opened through Finder—which might be subjected to Gatekeeper verification checks such as code signing and notarization—scripts downloaded and launched directly through Terminal (for example, by using osascript or shell interpreters) don’t undergo the same evaluation. This delivery mechanism enables attackers to initiate malware execution through user‑driven command invocation, reducing reliance on traditional application delivery methods and increasing the likelihood of successful execution. In this blog, we take a look at three campaigns that use this new tradecraft. We also provide mitigation guidance and detection details to help surface this threat. Activity overview Initial access Standalone websites were seen hosting pages that included a Base64-encrypted instruction for end users to run. Some sites present this information in multiple languages. As of this writing, these websites that we’ve observed are either already down or have been reported. Figure 1: Landing page of a script campaign (domenpozh[.]net) Figure 2. ClickFix instructions hosted on mac-storage-guide.squarespace[.]com. Figure 3. mac-storage-guide.squarespace[.]com page was seen presenting content in different languages, such as Japanese. In other instances, content that included instructions leading to malware were observed to be hosted on Craft, a note-taking platform that lets writers and content creators take notes and distribute their content. We’ve observed that pages like macclean[.]craft[.]me were taken down relatively quickly. Figure 4. ClickFix instruction hosted on macclean[.]craft[.]me. Threat ac

Executive summary In early 2026, a sophisticated intrusion initially appearing to be a standard Chaos ransomware attack was assessed to be consistent with a targeted state-sponsored operation. While the threat actor operated under the banner of the Chaos ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group, forensic analysis revealed the incident was a "false flag" masquerade. Technical artifacts, including a specific code-signing certificate and Command-and-Control (C2) infrastructure, suggest with moderate confidence that this activity is linked to MuddyWater (Seedworm), an Iranian Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS). The campaign was characterized by a high-touch social engineering phase conducted via Microsoft Teams, where the attackers utilized interactive screen-sharing to harvest credentials and manipulate Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Once inside, the group bypassed traditional ransomware workflows, forgoing file encryption in favor of data exfiltration and long-term persistence via remote management tools like DWAgent. This report deconstructs the infection chain and analyzes the custom "Game.exe" Remote Access Trojan (RAT). Additionally, this explores the process by which MuddyWater is increasingly leveraging the cybercriminal ecosystem to provide plausible deniability for geopolitical espionage and prepositioning, particularly in the US. The strategy highlights the convergence between state-sponsored intrusion activity and criminal tradecraft, where a big “tell” lies in the techniques that were deployed – and those that weren’t. This overall strategy suggests the primary goal was not financial gain. It is also further proof of the lines blurring against the background of geopolitical tensions, and that attribution is becoming more difficult if teams do not take it upon themselves to conduct proper and thorough research. Rapid7 coverage Rapid7 has coverage for this campaign across both intelligence and detection workflows. The campaign is available in Rapid7’s Intelligence Hub , providing customers with curated context, indicators, and threat actor tradecraft to support awareness, investigation, and prioritization. Relevant detections are also available in InsightIDR, helping security teams identify activity associated with this intrusion pattern across their environments. Chaos ransomware: Profile and targeting Active since February 2025, Chaos is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation specializing in big-game hunting (BGH) attacks against high-profile organizations, with reported ransom demands reaching up to $300,000. Despite the name, it is distinct from the Chaos malware builder identified in 2021. The group emerged shortly after the July 2025 law enforcement disruption of BlackSuit infrastructure during Operation Checkmate and is likely composed of former BlackSuit and/or Royal members. To expand its operations, Chaos advertises its affiliate program on cybercrime forums, such

DarkSword is a sophisticated piece of malware —probably government designed—that targets iOS. Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified a new iOS full-chain exploit that leveraged multiple zero-day vulnerabilities to fully compromise devices. Based on toolmarks in recovered payloads, we believe the exploit chain to be called DarkSword. Since at least November 2025, GTIG has observed multiple commercial surveillance vendors and suspected state-sponsored actors utilizing DarkSword in distinct campaigns. These threat actors have deployed the exploit chain against targets in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Malaysia, and Ukraine. DarkSword supports iOS versions 18.4 through 18.7 and utilizes six different vulnerabilities to deploy final-stage payloads. GTIG has identified three distinct malware families deployed following a successful DarkSword compromise: GHOSTBLADE, GHOSTKNIFE, and GHOSTSABER. The proliferation of this single exploit chain across disparate threat actors mirrors the previously discovered Coruna iOS exploit kit . Notably, UNC6353, a suspected Russian espionage group previously observed using Coruna, has recently incorporated DarkSword into their watering hole campaigns. A week after it was identified, a version of it leaked onto the internet, where it is being used more broadly. This news is a month old. Your devices are safe, assuming you patch regularly.

Someone pleaded guilty to secretly working for a ransomware gang as he negotiated ransomware payments for clients.

Researchers have reverse-engineered a piece of malware named Fast16. It’s almost certainly state-sponsored, probably US in origin, and was deployed against Iran years before Stuxnet: “…the Fast16 malware was designed to carry out the most subtle form of sabotage ever seen in an in-the-wild malware tool: By automatically spreading across networks and then silently manipulating computation processes in certain software applications that perform high-precision mathematical calculations and simulate physical phenomena, Fast16 can alter the results of those programs to cause failures that range from faulty research results to catastrophic damage to real-world equipment.” Another news article . Lots of interesting details at the links.

An attacker pushed a malicious version of the popular elementary-data package Python Package Index (PyPI) to steal sensitive developer data and cryptocurrency wallets. [...]

This update succeeds TeamPCP Supply Chain Campaign Update 007 , published April 8, 2026, which left the campaign in credential-monetization mode following the Cisco source code theft via Trivy-linked credentials, Google GTIG's formal designation of the operators as UNC6780 (with their credential stealer named SANDCLOCK), and the lapsed CISA KEV remediation deadline for CVE-2026-33634 with no standalone federal advisory. The Sportradar publication deadline flagged in Update 007 (approximately April 10 to 11) lapsed without a public CipherForce dump, and CipherForce's leak infrastructure has remained offline. Twelve days after Update 007, the technical compromise picture changed sharply across the W17 window (April 20 through April 26). The most significant development of the week was the end of TeamPCP's 26-day supply chain compromise pause, with three concurrent package compromises landing across npm, PyPI, and Docker Hub between April 21 and 22. The Checkmarx KICS Docker Hub repository was compromised on April 22 (claimed by TeamPCP via @pcpcats), the xinference PyPI package was poisoned the same day with a TeamPCP marker that the group publicly denied, and a self-propagating npm worm tracked as CanisterSprawl was identified by Socket and StepSecurity beginning April 21. The KICS Docker compromise then cascaded into a downstream compromise of @bitwarden/cli version 2026.4.0 the same evening when Bitwarden's Dependabot automation pulled the malicious checkmarx/kics:latest image into the Bitwarden CI/CD pipeline. Reporting suggests the campaign has visibly returned to its technical-discovery and active-compromise phase after spending most of April in credential-monetization mode; analysts assess the operators retain full operational capability despite the prior month's monetization failures. Dated event log 2026-04-20: ADT filed a Form 8-K with the SEC disclosing unauthorized access to certain cloud-based environments first identified the same day, with ShinyHunters subsequently posting a leak-site claim of over 10 million records and a 2026-04-27 publication deadline. The intrusion was attributed to a vishing attack against an ADT employee's Okta single sign-on account, which is a different access vector than the Trivy credential trove and therefore is NOT a confirmed TeamPCP supply chain campaign event; it is logged here only because ShinyHunters has been documented in prior updates as part of the TeamPCP-affiliated extortion ecosystem and remained operationally active during the target week. Source: BleepingComputer, https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/adt-confirms-data-breach-after-shinyhunters-leak-threat/ and Help Net Security, https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/04/27/adt-systems-data-breach/ 2026-04-21: Socket and StepSecurity began identifying a self-propagating npm supply chain worm tracked as CanisterSprawl, embedded across at least 16 malicious package versions across the @automagik, pgserve, @fairwo

Everything is dumb again. This week feels broken in a very familiar way. Old tricks are back. New tools are doing shady crap. Supply chains got hit. Fake help desks worked. Weird research showed how easy some attacks still are. Most of it feels like stuff we should have fixed years ago. Bad extensions. Stolen creds. Remote tools are getting abused. Malware hides in places people trust. Same