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How AI is Rewriting the Zero-Day Playbook for Preemptive SecurityRapid7 · just nowAembit Joins Snowflake to Tackle AI’s Next Security Frontier: Trusted Agent InteroperabilityHackRead · 49m agoBugs in Hugging Face Diffusers Bypass Custom Code SafeguardInfosecurity Magazine · 50m agoTengu Botnet Reboots Compromised Linux Devices When Defenders Kill Its ProcessThe Hacker News · 1h agoAI-Assisted Bug Hunt Uncovers Linux Kernel 0-Day in net/schedInfosecurity Magazine · 1h ago24,650 Internet-Exposed BMCs Disclose IPMI Password Hashes Before LoginThe Hacker News · 1h agoIs Your SSO Protected Against Modern Credential Attacks?BleepingComputer · 2h agoJFrog Confirms OpenAI Models Exploited Artifactory Zero-Day Before Hugging Face BreachThe Hacker News · 2h agoFrom Payments to Portfolios: How Financial Super Apps Rewrite Economics of Global InvestingHackRead · 2h agoPhishing Dominates as Initial Entry Method for Cyber-Attacks, as Hackers Hone Evasion TechniquesInfosecurity Magazine · 3h agoThe Next Evolution of MDR: Preemptive Defense and Agentic InvestigationRapid7 · 3h agoRapid7 Cyber GRC is now available: Turn security action into compliance proofRapid7 · 3h agoCritical OpenWrt DHCPv6 Flaw Could Let Unauthenticated Attackers Run Code as RootThe Hacker News · 3h agoMicrosoft Launches Flurry of AI Security Initiatives to Combat AI-Enabled ThreatsInfosecurity Magazine · 3h agoOver 24,000 exposed server BMCs leak password hash via decades-old flawBleepingComputer · 3h agoHow AI is Rewriting the Zero-Day Playbook for Preemptive SecurityRapid7 · just nowAembit Joins Snowflake to Tackle AI’s Next Security Frontier: Trusted Agent InteroperabilityHackRead · 49m agoBugs in Hugging Face Diffusers Bypass Custom Code SafeguardInfosecurity Magazine · 50m agoTengu Botnet Reboots Compromised Linux Devices When Defenders Kill Its ProcessThe Hacker News · 1h agoAI-Assisted Bug Hunt Uncovers Linux Kernel 0-Day in net/schedInfosecurity Magazine · 1h ago24,650 Internet-Exposed BMCs Disclose IPMI Password Hashes Before LoginThe Hacker News · 1h agoIs Your SSO Protected Against Modern Credential Attacks?BleepingComputer · 2h agoJFrog Confirms OpenAI Models Exploited Artifactory Zero-Day Before Hugging Face BreachThe Hacker News · 2h agoFrom Payments to Portfolios: How Financial Super Apps Rewrite Economics of Global InvestingHackRead · 2h agoPhishing Dominates as Initial Entry Method for Cyber-Attacks, as Hackers Hone Evasion TechniquesInfosecurity Magazine · 3h agoThe Next Evolution of MDR: Preemptive Defense and Agentic InvestigationRapid7 · 3h agoRapid7 Cyber GRC is now available: Turn security action into compliance proofRapid7 · 3h agoCritical OpenWrt DHCPv6 Flaw Could Let Unauthenticated Attackers Run Code as RootThe Hacker News · 3h agoMicrosoft Launches Flurry of AI Security Initiatives to Combat AI-Enabled ThreatsInfosecurity Magazine · 3h agoOver 24,000 exposed server BMCs leak password hash via decades-old flawBleepingComputer · 3h ago

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456 results in Malware

🦠 MalwareThe Hacker News·71d ago
⚡ Weekly Recap: Exchange 0-Day, npm Worm, Fake AI Repo, Cisco Exploit and More

Monday opens with a trust problem. A mail server flaw is under active use. A network control system was targeted. Trusted packages were poisoned. A fake model page pushed a stealer. Then came the familiar ransom claim: the data was returned and deleted. The pattern is clear. One weak dependency can leak keys. One leaked key can open cloud access. One cloud foothold can become a production

🦠 MalwareThe Hacker News·71d ago
Four Malicious npm Packages Deliver Infostealers and Phantom Bot DDoS Malware

Cybersecurity researchers have discovered four new npm packages containing information-stealing malware, one of which is a clone of the Shai-Hulud worm open-sourced by TeamPCP. The list of identified packages is below - chalk-tempalte (825 Downloads) @deadcode09284814/axios-util (284 Downloads) axois-utils (963 Downloads) color-style-utils (934 Downloads) "One of the packages (chalk-tempalte)

🦠 MalwareThe Hacker News·71d ago
Pre-Stuxnet Fast16 Malware Tampered with Nuclear Weapons Simulations

A new analysis of the Lua-based fast16 malware has confirmed that it was a cyber sabotage tool designed to tamper with nuclear weapons testing simulations. According to Broadcom-owned Symantec and Carbon Black teams, the pre-Stuxnet tool was engineered to corrupt uranium-compression simulations that are central to nuclear weapon design. "Fast16's hook engine is selectively interested in

🦠 MalwareThe Hacker News·73d ago
Turla Turns Kazuar Backdoor Into Modular P2P Botnet for Persistent Access

The Russian state-sponsored hacking group known as Turla has transformed its custom backdoor Kazuar into a modular peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet that's engineered for stealth and persistent access to compromised hosts. Turla, per the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), is assessed to be affiliated with Center 16 of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB)

🦠 MalwareSANS ISC·74d ago
[Guest Diary] New Malware Libraries means New Signatures, (Fri, May 15th)

:root { --isc-maroon: #7a1f1f; --isc-maroon-dark: #5e1717; --isc-link: #0066cc; --isc-text: #1a1a1a; --isc-muted: #555; --isc-rule: #d0d0d0; --isc-code-bg: #f4f4f4; --isc-code-text: #c0392b; --isc-block-bg: #1e1e1e; --isc-block-text: #e6e6e6; --isc-callout-bg: #fafafa; --isc-table-header: #ececec; } * { box-sizing: border-box; } html, body { margin: 0; padding: 0; background: #ffffff; color: var(--isc-text); font-family: "Open Sans", "Source Sans Pro", -apple-system, BlinkMacSystemFont, "Segoe UI", Roboto, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; font-size: 15px; line-height: 1.6; } .isc-header { background: var(--isc-maroon); color: #ffffff; padding: 14px 24px; border-bottom: 4px solid var(--isc-maroon-dark); } .isc-header .brand { font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 22px; font-weight: bold; letter-spacing: 0.3px; } .isc-header .brand a { color: #ffffff; text-decoration: none; } .isc-header .tagline { font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 12px; color: #f3d6d6; margin-top: 2px; } main { max-width: 920px; margin: 0 auto; padding: 28px 32px 48px; } h1.diary-title { font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 26px; line-height: 1.25; color: var(--isc-maroon); margin: 8px 0 10px 0; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--isc-rule); padding-bottom: 12px; } .meta { font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; color: var(--isc-muted); margin-bottom: 24px; } .meta strong { color: var(--isc-text); } .meta a { color: var(--isc-link); text-decoration: none; } .meta a:hover { text-decoration: underline; } h2 { font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 19px; color: var(--isc-maroon); margin-top: 32px; margin-bottom: 10px; padding-bottom: 4px; border-bottom: 1px solid var(--isc-rule); } h3 { font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 16px; color: var(--isc-text); margin-top: 22px; margin-bottom: 8px; } p { margin: 10px 0; } a { color: var(--isc-link); } a:hover { text-decoration: underline; } code, .inline-code { font-family: "SFMono-Regular", Consolas, "Liberation Mono", Menlo, Courier, monospace; font-size: 13px; background: var(--isc-code-bg); color: var(--isc-code-text); padding: 1px 5px; border-radius: 3px; word-break: break-all; } .callout { background: var(--isc-callout-bg); border-left: 3px solid var(--isc-maroon); padding: 10px 16px; margin: 14px 0; font-family: "SFMono-Regular", Consolas, "Liberation Mono", Menlo, Courier, monospace; font-size: 13px; color: var(--isc-text); } figure { margin: 22px 0; text-align: center; } figure img { max-width: 100%; height: auto; border: 1px solid #cccccc; display: block; margin: 0 auto; } figcaption { font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13px; color: var(--isc-muted); margin-top: 8px; font-style: italic; } figcaption strong { color: var(--isc-text); font-style: normal; } table.diary-table { border-collapse: collapse; width: 100%; margin: 16px 0; font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-size: 13.5px; } table.diary-table th, table.

🦠 MalwareMicrosoft Security·75d ago
Kazuar: Anatomy of a nation-state botnet

In this article Delivery Module types Botnet operations Who is Secret Blizzard? Mitigation and protection guidance Microsoft Defender detections Kazuar, a sophisticated malware family attributed to the Russian state actor Secret Blizzard , has been under constant development for years and continues to evolve in support of espionage-focused operations. Over time, Kazuar has expanded from a relatively traditional backdoor into a highly modular peer-to-peer (P2P) botnet ecosystem designed to enable persistent, covert access to target environments. This upgrade aligns with Secret Blizzard’s broader objective of gaining long-term access to systems for intelligence collection. The threat actor has historically targeted organizations in the government and diplomatic sector in Europe and Central Asia, as well as systems in Ukraine previously compromised by Aqua Blizzard, very likely for the purpose of obtaining information supporting Russia’s foreign policy and military objectives. While many threat actors rely on increasing usage of native tools (living-off-the-land binaries (LOLBins)) to avoid detection, Kazuar’s progression into a modular bot highlights how Secret Blizzard is engineering resilience and stealth directly into their tooling. By separating responsibilities across Kernel, Bridge, and Worker modules and restricting external communications to a single elected leader, Kazuar reduces its observable footprint. It also maintains flexible tasking, data staging, and multiple fallback channels for command and control (C2). Understanding this architecture helps defenders move beyond single sample analysis and instead focus on the behaviors that keep the botnet operational: leader election, inter-process communication (IPC) message routing, working directory staging, and periodic exfiltration. Kazuar’s capabilities and tradecraft have been widely documented by the security research community, and prior reporting, including Unit 42’s write-up and a recent deep dive into its loader capabilities , remains relevant today. This blog is an in-depth analysis of Kazuar’s progression from a single, monolithic framework into a modular bot ecosystem composed of three distinct module types, each with clearly defined roles. Together, these components distribute functionality across the P2P botnet, enabling flexible configuration, lower observability, and broad tasking while minimizing opportunities for detection. Delivery Kazuar is delivered through multiple dropper variants. In one observed method, the Pelmeni dropper embeds the encrypted second-stage payload directly within the dropper as an encrypted byte array. The payload is often bound to the target environment (for example, encrypted using the target hostname) so it only decrypts and executes on the intended host. In another method, the dropper deploys a small .NET loader alongside the final payload. The dropper then invokes the loader (often configured as a COM object) and supplies the decrypted pay