Crypto Clipper uses Tor and worm-like propagation for persistence and control

In this article Attack chain overview Mitigation and protection guidance References Learn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence and Microsoft Defender Experts identified a Windows-based cryptocurrency clipper that has affected users since February of 2026. Clipper malware relies on stealing clipboard data and parsing it for valuable assets. The clipper in this campaign relies on Windows Script Host and ActiveX-driven logic to launch a bundled Tor proxy and poll a hidden-service C2 server. It carries out high-frequency clipboard theft, screenshot exfiltration, and wallet-address substitution. The execution of this clipper is notable because it does not depend on a traditional installer or exposed IP-based C2 infrastructure. Instead, it deploys a portable Tor client, routes traffic through a local SOCKS5 proxy, and blends data theft with remote code execution, turning a financially motivated stealer into a lightweight backdoor. For defenders, the strongest signals are behavioral: script interpreters spawning suspicious child processes, localhost:9050 proxy usage, screen-capture commands in PowerShell, and signs of clipboard inspection or crypto-address replacement. Microsoft Defender for Endpoint detects multiple components of this threat such as Suspicious JavaScript process and Possible data exfiltration using Curl . Additionally, Microsoft Defender Antivirus detects this crypto clipper as Trojan: Win32/CryptoBandits.A . Attack chain overview Since February 2026, malicious shortcut (.lnk) payloads have infected devices with a cryptocurrency clipper. This malware comprises two components that it deploys on the compromised system: a worm component that ensures propagation and a clipper/stealer component that harvests and exfiltrates cryptocurrency wallet information. The worm functionality ensures propagation by creating additional malicious shortcuts of legitimate files it identifies on the device. It also delivers file-based payloads and excludes them from Defender scanning. It deploys scheduled tasks for execution and persistence for both the worm component and the stealer component. Figure 1 presents a high-level execution flow of the two components. The clipper runs as a script-based payload that interacts with the operating system through WScript and ActiveXObject. It includes an anti-analysis check that queries running processes and exits if Task Manager is detected. If the environment passes this gate, the malware launches a renamed Tor binary named ugate.exe in a hidden window, waits about 60 seconds for Tor to bootstrap, generates a victim GUID, and registers the infected device with a hidden-service C2. After registration, the malware enters a continuous loop. It polls the C2 for instructions and monitors the clipboard roughly every 500 milliseconds, extracting seed phrases and private keys that match wallet-related patterns. It also hijacks cryptocurrency addresses by replacing copied wallet values with attacker-controlled alternatives and